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Practical Security Aspects of the Internet
of Things
Jörn Mehnen, Hongmei He, Stefano Tedeschi and Nikolaos Tapoglou
Abstract Industry 4.0 and with that the Internet of Things (IoT) are expected to
revolutionize the industrial world. The vast amount of interconnected devices bear
the great opportunity to collect valuable information for advancing decision making
in management and technology to improve through-life management of a product.
Cyber-physical systems and the Internet of Services will revolutionize our current
world through fully interconnected communication where information and services
are becoming ubiquitous. The availability of information across a system of systems
can be very powerful when utilized properly and harnessed adequately. The vast
network of small, power-sensitive and often deeply embedded devices that are
streaming potentially commercially sensitive data over long periods of time poses
an entirely different type of threat than known from the conventional PC world.
Adequate and sensible measures need to be taken right at the design stage of IoT
devices in order to take best advantage of Industry 4.0 technology. This chapter
introduces a set of key security issues related to the implementation of IoT in an
industrial mechanical engineering context. A real-world example concerning
remote maintenance of CNC machine tools illustrates the different threat scenarios
related to IoT in practice. The paper touches on Big Data and Cloud Manufacturing
but will remain focused on improving security at the Edge of IoT, i.e. where data is
collected, transmitted and eventually transferred back to the physical actuators. The
aim of this chapter is to introduce a generic overview of real-world IoT security
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issues as well as giving a deeper technical example-supported insight into practical
considerations for designing IoT systems for practical use in business.
Keywords IoT security ⋅ Industry 4.0 ⋅ Remote maintenance of CNC machines
1 Introduction
The term “Industry 4.0”, though not very well deﬁned yet, is used to describe in
broad terms the move from the third Industrial Revolution or Digital Revolution,
which encompasses the change from mechanical, and electronic technology to
digital technology, to the fourth Industrial Revolution which covers the world of
Cyber-Physical Systems, the Internet of Things and the Internet of Services (Kang
et al. 2016). All three aspects of Industry 4.0 are hinging on secure communication.
Hence, it is of utmost importance that business can utilize the opportunities that the
Internet offers in a secure, conﬁdent, agile and prosperous way. Business needs to
be equipped with the knowledge about the capabilities and limitations and potential
risks the Cyberspace poses to fully exploit the rich opportunities of the digital era.
Cyberattacks continue to create a Tier 1 risk. This has been expressed clearly in the
National Security Risk Assessment of 2015 (UK Government 2015).
Security helps improving trust, collaboration, individual industrial competitive
advantage and even maintaining national security and individual safety. Industry
4.0 requires maintaining strict access to conﬁdential data as well as to digital
services and physical processes that are linked to complex cyber-physical systems
that can control whole factories at a physical as well as at the decisions level. Fast
and agile security measures that are able to adapt to the quickly changing attack
strategies in Cyberspace need to be in place to make Industry 4.0 work efﬁciently
now and in the long term future.
The intention of this chapter is to address the concerns of industry which is
trying to adopt IoT to secure new business opportunities. Section 2 of this chapter
introduces generic security threats related to industrial IoT. Section 3 of this chapter
discusses a practical real-world example with the intention to demonstrate the
generic security topics from Sect. 2 in a practical mechanical engineering envi-
ronment. Section 4 summarizes the previous sections and draws further
conclusions.
2 IoT Security Threats
In an Industry 4.0 context, communication cannot be treated as an isolated process
anymore. Systems are getting increasingly interconnected and this trend will con-
tinue also in the future. Readily available information at every level will be
expected by managers as well as by the people on the ground who are running and
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maintaining machines. Systems that may have been designed with the intention to
be entirely isolated may, at a later stage, get connected to other systems to utilize
their power more efﬁciently at a global level. For example, the connection of
well-tested though isolated legacy systems with new and advancing services
through the Internet can help retaining these useful legacy systems instead of
making them obsolete. Systems—and particularly IoT systems—should be
designed right from the start with the option to integrate them with other systems at
any time in a well-controlled and comparatively easy and smooth way.
Industry 4.0 technology utilizes the Internet of Things to facilitate the concept of
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that offers new business opportunities through the
Internet of Services. In the manufacturing domain, the Internet of Services is also
known as Cloud Manufacturing (Li and Mehnen 2013). The concept of Serviti-
zation (Raddats et al. 2016; Huxtable and Schaefer 2016) introduces a new business
approach where the conventional approach of selling a product is replaced by
providing a service to a customer while the product itself often remains property of
the manufacturer. This approach introduces new challenges to the manufacturer
because the associated new availability contract schemes leave the manufacturer
with the Through-Life service tasks which cover the whole life span of a product
from its design and manufacture, over its repair, maintenance or overhaul to its ﬁnal
recycle or disposal. In this scenario, the Internet of Things can help in various
aspects. Real-time data can be gathered for example for product and process
monitoring purposes. Large amounts of data can be streamed together to form Big
Data (Pääkkönen and Pakkala 2015) that can be exploited at a higher level, for
example to support strategic condition based maintenance decisions based on
thorough Big Data analytics or as feedback into design and manufacture. IoT can
also help in converting the analytical decisions made in the Cloud into automated
actions that influence processes and product utilization actively.
2.1 Top Security Issues in IoT Systems
The increasing use of the Internet and mobile devices means that the hard
boundaries of enterprises are disappearing and, as a result, the risk landscape is
increasing. IoT enabled Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are facing vulnerabilities
and threats from the Internet (He et al. 2016). This has attracted the attention from
researcher. For example, the European project E-CRIME (2016) provided a
cyber-crime inventory and networks in non-ICT sectors. It has shown that the cause
of system interference can range from viruses, worms, Trojan horses, software
bombs, disrupting computer services, Denial of Computer Services to sabotage.
Advanced manufacturing systems are not secure like traditional systems.
Cybersecurity has become a critical challenge in IoT enabled CPS, which could be
threatened by a wide variety of cyber-attacks ranging from criminals and terrorists
to hacktivists. As a consequence, Cybersecurity is critical for the success of Smart
Manufacturing. Cyber-threats to the Industrial IoT are real, global and growing,
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including theft of trade secrets and intellectual property, hostile alterations to data,
and disruptions or denial of process control (Albert 2015). The public is becoming
increasingly aware of the potential security threats caused by the malicious
exploitation of poorly secured systems.
A distinct feature of Smart Manufacturing is that the manufacturing processes
are connected to the suppliers through the Internet. Suppliers will have increased
visibility of material consumption on the plant floor and can replenish stock
just-in-time. Pervasive visibility and proactive replenishment are the two major
beneﬁts of IoT to the Manufacturing Supply Chain (NN 2016). However, organi-
sations or enterprises within a connected supply chain will have different levels of
security. A determined aggressor, e.g. an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), usu-
ally identiﬁes the organisation with the weakest cybersecurity within the supply
chain and uses these vulnerabilities to gain access to other members of the supply
chain. The smaller organisations within a supply chain, due to more limited
resources, often have the weakest cybersecurity arrangements (CERT-UK 2015)
(Fig. 1).
It is estimated that the number of connected devices will increase to 40 billion by
2020 (Baxter 2016). A huge number of connected devices (including sensors) will
produce a huge amount of data. The data flow across all levels of the information
exchange throughout the whole IoT infrastructure can potentially be open to vul-
nerabilities. Therefore, data protection and privacy is one of IoT priority challenges
(Chen 2012).
IoT is where the Internet meets the physical world. This has some serious
implications on security as the attack threat moves from manipulating information
to controlling actuation. Consequently, it drastically expands the attack surface
from known threats and known devices to additional security threats of new
devices, protocols and work-flows. Many manufacturing systems are moving from
closed systems (e.g. SCADA, Modbus, CIP) into IP-based Cyber-Physical Systems.
This further expands the attack surface. Figure 2 shows the evolution from a
legitimate Industry Control System (ICS) to a modern ICS. Cybersecurity risks are
Fig. 1 IoT manufacturing supply chain (redrawn after NN 2016)
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brought to the modern ICS while a legitimate ICS is incorporated with IT capacity.
The state of vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that a legitimate ICS uses
typically older equipment and is not yet well-secured against modern networked
environments (Korolov 2016). This is because the components of a traditional ICS
are communicating with speciﬁc protocols often without any security concern.
Therefore, the big challenge is how to protect legitimate ICS from attacks when
they are connected to the Internet.
2.2 The Architecture of IoT Systems
Considering the different areas of applications of IoT, one can, in general, divide
IoT security issues into different areas which are either related to the fundamental
IoT technical architecture and communication threats, the IoT application (threats
from the environment, data flow and ﬁnal use of data), or threats cause by IoT users
(threats human interaction). It is also possible to divide IoT threats into logical (the
use of data and meta-data and decision making), software threats and physical
(hardware) threats. The categorization of IoT threats is closely related to the
architectural structure of IoT and the use of IoT devices and its data.
Figure 3 shows the general IoT architecture as a multi-tiered hierarchical
structure. The lowest level contains input and output devices—this level is often
called the Edge. The second lowest level is the level where data is collected and
processed but not sent into the Internet yet. Communication between devices at this
level is generally referred to as Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication. The
third level concerns the transmission of data into the Internet and up into the related
Cloud services. The highest level offers high level compute and/or memory
intensive Cloud Services and Apps for either directly decision support or data
storage and data exchange. Information can usually flow freely within this stack.
The Edge level itself can be further subdivided. The lowest tier of that level
starts with the basic sensors or actuators which generally do not come with any
particular intelligence per se. A simple data receiving and preprocessing device may
Fig. 2 Evolutions from legitimate ICS to modern ICS (redrawn after He et al. 2016)
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add additional basic intelligence to the sensor or actuator. An attached transceiver
sends data from the intelligent sensor to an Internet connected element, for example
a router. An additional transceiver may add an optional level for converting data
protocols or switching between data communication technologies (e.g. Bluetooth to
WiFi or NRF and LiFi and vice versa). This level is the typical domain of M2M
communication which does not necessarily include any Internet connection.
However, also this layer shall be considered in the following as an integral part of
IoT. The approach of making IoT agnostic to the physical and transport layer
protocols used by devices concept has been referred to as the Web of Things
(WoT) (Guinard and Trifa 2016). Figure 3 shows the complete IoT stack including
the detailed Edge.
2.3 Security Issues in the IoT Stack
Considering IoT security, one should consider the allover Internet protocol security
down to the Edge. Concerning IoT security at Tier 3 and above only would imply
ignoring any potential IoT security issues that are coming directly from the data
generation and preprocessing levels. Security levels at Tier 3 and above are typi-
cally well-developed as these levels use conventional Internet technology. Security
technology and threats at these levels are well understood and supported by agreed
standards and controlled through strict regulations.
In the IoT world, however, several consortia such as AllJoyn, Thread, Open
Interconnect Consortium (OCI) or the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC) are
developing (partially competing) IoT standards. At the communication/transport
layer there are also various standards such as ISA100.11a, IEEE 802.15.4, NFC,
ANT, Bluetooth, Eddystone, ZigBee, EnOcean, or WiMax. All these standards
Fig. 3 IoT stack architecture
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offer different levels and schemata for implementing security. Typical security
standards in IoT—which are also used in the wider Internet—are the Open Trust
Protocol (OTrP) and X.509 with the latter being the most popular standard for
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) management using digital certiﬁcates and
public-key encryption.
Security issues at the top two tiers of the IoT stack are typically addressed
through Internet security measures which apply to the conventional Internet world.
As this is well-discussed in literature, in the following only the two lowest tiers of
the IoT stack will be discussed in more detail to highlight especially potential
security threats at the IoT Edge.
2.3.1 Threats at the IoT Edge
Threats to security at the Tier 1 and Tier 2 level, i.e. security issues at the sensor,
transceiver and converter layer level can be divided into security threats (Shahri and
Ismail 2012; Di and Smith 2007) caused by
(A) humans,
(B) technical insufﬁciencies, and
(C) physical attacks of the actual IoT hardware.
Examples for Class A threats at the IoT level, i.e. security issues caused
deliberately or involuntarily by humans considering sensors, communication, and
data exchange are:
• Data entry errors or omissions
• Improper use or disposal of sensitive data
• Improper use and electronic setup of equipment
• Inadvertent acts or carelessness
• Ignorance of warnings and errors
• Ignorance due to the low cost of the equipment (“throwaway mentality”)
• Underestimation of technological complexity
• Insufﬁcient password management
• Procedural violation
• Espionage and eavesdropping
• Impersonation and identity theft
• Shoulder surﬁng, i.e. the deliberate attempt to gain access to protected infor-
mation through observation
• High level data analytics can reveal hidden information
Examples for Class B threats due to internal technical issues, i.e. software and
hardware issues, are:
• Compromising emanations, i.e. unintentional data-related or
intelligence-bearing signals, which, if intercepted and analyzed, could disclose
sensitive information that is transmitted and/or processed
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• Corruption by system errors or system failures
• Data and system contamination, i.e. the intermixing of data of different sensi-
tivity levels can lead to an accidental or intentional violation of data integrity
• Insertion of malicious code or software
• Poor programming styles and habits
• Insufﬁcient authentication methods (weak cryptography due to limited power,
memory and speed of the Edge devices; weak random number generators)
• Misrepresentation of identity or authorization
• Insufﬁcient and irregular ﬁrmware updates
• Data overload and improper error handling (poor Quality of Service)
• Inadequately managed and operated equipment that is mostly dormant
• Exploitation of network flaws (connections and data protocols)
• Power failures
• Obsolescence and system inconsistencies over time
• Inconsistent or changing communication protocols
Class C deal with attacks on hardware and communication through physical
means. Examples of Class C issues are:
• Physical tampering with the hardware, i.e. unauthorized physical modiﬁcation
or alteration of equipment in a manner that degrades the security functionality of
the asset
• Electromagnetic attacks through electromagnetic interference (EMI) to impact
the signal transmission or the device electronics directly causing interruptions in
the electronic operation of the system
• Introduction of detrimental environmental conditions, i.e. inadequate humidity
or temperature causing the circuits to malfunction or deliberatively degrade or
age quickly
• Introduction of hazardous materials which are flammable, oxidizing or com-
bustible, explosive, corrosive, an irritant or radioactive
• Mechanical attacks (cutting of cables, ripping, breaking, bending)
• Deliberate power fluctuation, low power or power spikes
• Side channel attacks (timing attack, power-analysis attack, electromagnetic
attack) (Di-Battista et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2015)
Different to conventional Internet and PC technology, IoT devices are often
embedded and hard to reach. Ideally, IoT devices are virtually invisible and
working unnoticed over long periods of time while requiring minimal maintenance
and external energy. IoT devices are susceptible to security issues due to their need
for constant power supply, their limited memory size as well as potentially inad-
equate ﬁrmware updates and maintenance.
Regular integrity scans such as virus detections are much harder to achieve in
IoT networks than in the PC world due to the limited electrical and computational
power of the device. Secure authorization in IoT devices is of special importance as
it guarantees legitimate access to the device for servicing and data access. For very
power and memory limited IoT devices even authentication can become a serious
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issue as reliable cryptographic methods require power and memory. The use of poor
pseudo number generators can compromise authentication and cryptographic
exchange of data across the network.
The large number of IoT devices and their connectivity opens a potentially large
attack surface. Re-organization of IoT networks, structures and data protocols and
changing users with changing authorization rights require a strict and continuous
maintenance of the IoT network already at the lowest levels. A single breach into
one device can create a broad scale attack if many devices are following the same
inadequate security setup.
A simple change of ownership of equipment containing embedded IoT devices
can cause the leaking of potentially sensitive information to the new owner of the
device. With the introduction of the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 enters application in May 2018), this risk will
require serious consideration by the liable OEMs.
The physical attack of the IoT hardware itself with regards to tempering or
destruction is hardly mentioned in the literature. However, the physical Edge of IoT
is very vulnerable to physical attacks as it is exposed to either physical degradation
over time or active physical attacks. This holds for many IoT devices, from
wearables to sensors that are embedded in industrial tools or military applications.
Relying on the correctness of the data from these devices can be crucial. Important
decisions, jobs and even lives can depend on the reliability of the communication.
Physical protection of the devices is a research topic that concerns design, manu-
facture, programming, installation as well as the maintenance of the devices.
Adding security as an “afterthought” to an existing design has the potential to be
inadequate or causing long term issues that can become expensive or even dan-
gerous. Hence, designing IoT devices right from the start with security in mind
becomes an imperative that cannot be overlooked. Lessons learned from the current
Internet and PC world can certainly help building new IoT technology that is
reliable, safe and secure.
2.4 IoT Communication Technology
The current typical data communication protocols and techniques available for the
IoT stack between the Internet, local area networks, individual machines, trans-
ceivers, sensors and actuators are summarized in Table 1.
The choice of the best technology depends on the application and its require-
ments. This concerns communication speed, the distance any data can be sent
reliably, memory requirements, data processing and transmission power and the
required security level. Another practical issue to be considered is the physical
environment (electrical noise) as well as the ease of installation, use and mainte-
nance. The management of a large number of devices with their individual iden-
tiﬁcation, authentication and management can become a challenge in IoT as well.
Some protocols such as WiFi and ZigBee offer identiﬁcation, authentication and
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build-in data security, while other technologies such as Near Radio Frequency
(NRF), point-to-point laser communication, LiFi (Light Fidelity, i.e. communica-
tion via light), basic infrared communication or sound often do not offer these
features by default.
Data transport protocols such as SHTML and TLS (Dierks and Rescorla 2008)
offer current best secure data communication modes based on authentication and
keys. Bluetooth builds on authentication through pairing. However, Bluetooth is not
immune to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and hence an appropriate IoT software
design is required to minimize any such risks. Bluetooth data is typically encrypted
by default to minimize eavesdropping, however, issues have been reported around
in low-energy variants of Bluetooth models (Zhang et al. 2011).
Popular protocols for Internet data exchange in IoT are REST (Representational
State Transfer), SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol), CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) and MQTT and AMQP (both OASIS standards for light
weight Internet/IoT), XMPP-IoT (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol) or
LWM2M (Lightweight M2M). These protocols co-exist with several other proto-
cols and also next to less flexible proprietary direct peer-to-peer data exchange
protocols depending on the communication technique adopted. OPC UA is an
international standard for connecting devices on the plant floor with well-developed
interfaces to the Internet and Cloud services providing a uniﬁed standard for user
authentication and authorization, auditability and availability. OPC UA is also the
recommended standard of secure connectivity in the Reference Architecture Model
Industry 4.0 (RAMI4.0) (VDI/VDE 2016).
REST is used in local networks or across the Internet. REST uses standardized
HTTP verbs (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc.) to send data or request data
packages from web resources identiﬁed by Uniform Resource Identiﬁers (URI).
RESTful implementations make use of standards such as HTTP, URL, JSON, and
XML for a structured data exchange. REST like SOAP are not secure protocols per
Table 1 Technical aspects of IoT device communication
Mode Technology Protocols
Internet WiFi, ethernet, cloud SHTML, MQTT, XMPP,
TLS/SSL, CoAP, AMQP,
Mihini/M3DA, DDS, REST,
SOAP, websockets, OPC UA
M2M Wiﬁ, bluetooth, Xbee various
NRF techniques, LiFi, laser,
infrared, sound (e.g.
ultrasound), direct wire
connection
SHTML, HTML, MQTT,
XMPP-IoT, TLS/SSL, CoAP,
AMQP, MQTT-SN,
Mihini/M3DA, DDS,
LWM2M, REST, SOAP,
websocket, reactive streams
Sensor/transceiver/actuator Mainly direct wire. In case of a
detached modular combinations
(see also Fig. 5) any of the
M2M
options are applicable
Plain secure wire
communication; otherwise see
above
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se. Security comes through other secure communication layers such as TLS, direct
data encryption or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) or through the implementation as
in the case of Reactive Streams (Java/JavaScript).
MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) was initially designed for oil
pipeline maintenance through satellite communication. MQTT is an open data
exchange protocol (OASIS standard since 2014, Banks and Gupta 2015) which is
becoming increasingly popular in the IoT community due to its various light weight
(i.e. small code size) implementations provided in many computer languages. It
offers high data exchange speed and little overhead. MQTT supports scalability to
manage very large numbers of IoT modules. MQTT requires a central data broker to
which many clients can subscribe to receive messages related to topics that have
been published on the broker by other clients. Clients can identify themselves at the
broker through passwords. With respect to security, MQTT relies mainly on the
security coming from underlying communication layers or the security offered by
the application. Exchanged data is by default not encrypted but the MQTT payload
can, of course, be encrypted. A major advantage of MQTT is the adjustable Quality
of Service (QoS) that guarantee that messages reception can been acknowledged.
This can be of particular interest for example in a TES manufacturing environment
where e.g. information of machine downtime may need to be recorded reliably for
contract reasons.
The enterprise-level Advanced Message Queuing Protocol AMQP (ISO/IEC
19464) provides a platform-agnostic method for ensuring information safe transport
between applications and among organizations. Notable users of AMQP come from
areas such as the ﬁnancial sector, US Department of Homeland Security or oper-
ating systems. The framing and protocol deﬁnitions for security layers in AMQP are
expected to be deﬁned externally as in the case of TLS. An exception to this is the
SASL (Melnikov and Zeilenga 2006) security layer which depends on its host
protocol to provide framing.
The Cloud can provide a means to automate complex decision processes through
secure Cloud computing services. When based on IoT technology, these services
employ a variety of technologies that can process large amounts of data in a
massively parallel way. Data may stream into these services at a continuous and
rapid speed or at long time intervals when the device is dormant to save power. IoT
means connecting systems with systems. Hence, one has to design IoT systems for
a mix of different data speeds and data types. Devices and services with a variety of
different properties and demands need to be managed in parallel using services that
employ techniques such as asynchronous “lazy evaluation” (e.g. used in Node.js,
Wilson 2013) in a non-halting manner to deal with different speeds of responses
from the services to minimize waiting time for the service requesting clients. While
this can be a challenge in itself, authentication and secure data exchange between
the highest and the lowest IoT levels need to be maintained throughout the complex
network of devices and services.
In contrast to the conventional PC world, where the communication is typically
comparatively stable and error free; this might not be the case with IoT devices and
their networks. IoT networks should to be designed with robustness against
Practical Security Aspects of the Internet of Things 235
jorn.mehnen@strath.ac.uk
communication errors in mind. Due to the simple characteristics of the basic sensors
in IoT systems communication errors are more likely. Noisy data should not be
misinterpreted as attacks. Tunneling solutions that improve software security can
potentially get confused or work less efﬁcient if they are overloaded by erroneous
data due to poor communication channels or deeply embedded or poorly designed
IoT devices.
3 Technical Example: Remote Maintenance of Machine
Tools
Remote maintenance of machine tools requires reliable and safe communication
from machine to machine and from the machine to the services that offer decision
making support through the Cloud. Remote maintenance also requires a secure
route for the information back to the machine tool and the human where the
decisions are automatically actuated or manually executed.
3.1 IoT Remote Maintenance Architecture
In the context of this section, remote maintenance of machine tools will be regarded
as all tasks that cover machine tool monitoring, data analysis for through-life ser-
vice support and the actuation of any maintenance of the machine tool. Through-life
service support for machine maintenance deals with machine performance and
failure prediction of individual machine tools and machine tool components and
globally interconnected machine tool assemblies. Through-life service support also
covers maintenance support through dashboards and rule based decisions support
considering the whole-life performance of a machine tool.
IoT serves remote maintenance through sensor networks, advanced data ana-
lytics, visualization as well as, if requested, active automated or semi-automated
maintenance services that help extending the life of a machine tool. A particularly
attractive aspect of IoT is that this technology can be applied not only to existing
new machine tools but also to upgrade older (in the following called “legacy”)
machine tools that are typically not well Internet enabled. Advancing legacy
machines through IoT into the age of Industry 4.0 is not only attractive to industry
as a technological means to maintain legacy machines but also to retain and upgrade
existing and often very expensive equipment. IoT also offers the advantage that
young machine tool operators can enjoy the quality of interaction with machines
that a new generation of workers and technicians would be expecting after expe-
riencing modern smart communication technology such as smart phones and
tablets.
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In this section an example of remote machine tool maintenance is presented that
looks into security issues related to IoT sensors deployed in machine tools, the
secure data transfer into the Cloud and secure data transfer back to the level of IoT
actuators on the machine. Figure 4 illustrates the general setup of a possible IoT
supported remote maintenance architecture for machine tools. In this setup, intel-
ligent sensors and actuator units (see also Fig. 5) are embedded in the machine. The
flexibility of small though powerful intelligent IoT Units and their application
inside the machine tool makes the application of IoT technology a lot easier and
more convenient than the use of large IoT devices. The setup in Fig. 4 can be
applied to both, modern as well as legacy machines. Information from existing data
interfaces directly from the machine tool such as MTconnect® or data from
industrial ERP, PLM and Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) can be aug-
mented with Big Data from secure Cloud Services.
IoT security has to be considered especially in industrial networks where data
security is associated with company integrity but also directly with safety on the
plant floor. In a machine tool, IoT devices can get exposed to very harsh envi-
ronments. Corrosive liquids, destructive heat and vibrations can be the source of
device degradation and the sometimes intense electrical noise coming from the
drives or the spindle can cause communication issues. Interception of data about
machine performance and machine availability can be harmful to the reputation and
competitiveness of a company. Unauthorized use or manipulation of IoT devices
Fig. 4 An example of a Secure IoT supported remote maintenance architecture for modern as well
as legacy machine tools
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can cause threats to the machine and potentially even to the operator. When
embedded in the working space of a machine tool, IoT devices should be virtually
unnoticeable, i.e. they should use as few wires and setups as possible. They should
work robustly over long periods of time without any interruptions while needing
none or only minimal maintenance (e.g. ﬁrmware updates or low power supply).
This makes the selection of the right and reliable IoT technologies a non-trivial task.
Having a machine tool that can be controlled and operated remotely can safe cost
and time, increase convenience and flexibility and even open new business
opportunities. For example, remote maintenance can help saving cost on mainte-
nance personnel that can otherwise be more efﬁciently deployed for complex tasks
where human intelligence is really required. Employing secure IoT sensors and
actuators should not be complex or expensive while requiring only a minimum
amount of variation (i.e. non-invasive) to the machine tool. Augmenting machine
tools should be gradually scalable, i.e. it should be possible to add, remove or
replace as many IoT devices as deemed necessary while maintaining an entirely
secure IoT environment. One approach to address these requirements is modular-
ization of IoT devices.
3.2 A Novel Modular IoT Unit
In the following a new modularization concept for IoT devices is introduced. The
advantage of modularization is the flexibility to easily replace specialized secure
Fig. 5 Secure modular sensor/actuator/communication IoT Unit
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and temper-hardened components. Modularization also helps with flexible scaling
of the device capabilities and adapting the device to the individual local require-
ments. Modular devices are lean and flexible and can adapt and scale to the actual
engineering needs while minimizing the potential attack surface.
Figure 5 illustrates the concept of a modular and standardized IoT Unit for
sensing, actuating and communicating at the M2M level as well as into the Cloud.
The standardized secure interfaces allows for quick replacement of individual
sensors, actuators or transceivers. The IoT Unit can also act as a modem, i.e. it can
convert one communication protocol and technology into another. This allows for
building rapidly complex heterogeneous and robust IoT Unit networks. Although
machine tool data will be collected in areas with potentially high electrical noise, all
the data should be preferably transferred wirelessly to increase convenience of
deployment. A modular approach allows to pick and choose the combination of the
most robust communication means. Small and modular IoT devices also have the
advantage to be comparatively cheap and easy to maintain and replace.
For the actual design of the IoT Unit a small and robust build size (estimated size
between 50 and 100 mm excluding the power source embedded in epoxy) is pre-
ferred so that the actual unit ﬁts easily into any machine tool. The power source
uses ideally an energy harvesting unit or solar panel to allow longevity and inde-
pendence. Although the current battery powered solutions are often feasible, a ﬁnal
choice of the power source will depend on the amount of power required for
transferring data or for actuating e.g. motors.
The IoT Unit displayed in Fig. 5 shows an intended design of a sealed secure
IoT Unit. Standardized communication interfaces between the components using an
elaborate hardware and software authorization protocol allow access to the com-
ponent data only for authorized users (Tedeschi et al. 2017). The whole approach is
designed to be auditable so that any misuse can be spotted and prosecuted if
necessary. The data preprocessing unit (in the middle of the IoT Unit) encrypts and
decrypts data streams continuously to guarantee data security at all times. For that a
miniature hardware AES cryptography low power IC solution has been developed
and successfully tested.
To minimize the physical attack surface and also to accommodate for the small
physical built size, the limited power supply and the typically limited memory to
process data, the secure modular IoT sensor/transmitter/actuator device prefers a
setup that uses only a single sensor or actuator and a single communication com-
ponent at a time. In a machine tool environment the ZigBee protocol and hardware
has shown to be a robust and secure communication solution (Tapoglou et al.
2015). Direct point-to-point communication through lasers is fast (e.g. for data
streaming) and robust against electrical noise. However, this technique requires a
clear line of sight and good geometric alignment of sender and receiver. Small IoT
WiFi solutions (TCP/IP, UDP, etc.) offer the ﬁdelity and convenience of classic
Internet protocols with its associate security. Depending on the underlying proto-
cols (e.g. MQTT is fast, reliable and scalable), WiFi protocols offer high speed
(realistically between 20 Mbps and 100+ Mbps for 802.11 g/n and 802.11 ac,
respectively) and reliability. The proposed IoT Unit offers the opportunity to
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flexibly conﬁgure hybrid solutions. NRF, WiFi, ZigBee and other technologies can
be utilize and combined to make the best of all individual technologies.
The current cost for the hardware of the proposed and tested IoT Unit lies on the
average around £10 (excl. the power source). The actual hardware cost of the IoT
Unit depends, of course, on the cost of the individual components with GPS, micro
cameras and ZigBee being the most expensive while light and temperature sensors
and accelerometers being comparatively cheap. The small and extremely cost
efﬁcient ESP8266/NodeMCU® modules as well as the technically well-advanced
Intel Edison® are very versatile and programmable IoT units (both low power 3.3 V
technology). All sensor and actuator technologies shown in Fig. 5 have been
implemented and successfully tested as prototypes. However, the proposed design
is still in its early stage and under constant research and development.
Remote machine maintenance offers great opportunities for the end user on the
machine through improved awareness of the current and predicted machine per-
formance, information about potential optimization options of the use and setup of a
machine tool as well as potential active remote repair and control of the machine
tool. Remote maintenance is also a flexible platform for software and service
developers that want to offer new machine tool related services. The interconnec-
tion of the IoT solutions offers opportunities to improve project planning through
simulation and information of the supply chain well in advance before a tool breaks
or a spare part is required. Secure remote maintenance can play an important role in
providing new services and business opportunities for Through-life Engineering
and Industry 4.0.
4 Summary and Conclusion
The Internet of Things is a phenomenon that is currently receiving immense
attention due to the rapid move of industry to adopt Industry 4.0. The concept of
Cyber-Physical Systems is an integral component of the Industry 4.0 idea. It
requires that objects are connected through the Internet or amongst themselves to
create a fully interconnected industrial networked environment that offers smart
solutions that improve decision making or direct automated process control.
However, the large number of interconnected things requires secure and safe
communication so that any decisions and actions made are based on reliable and
properly authorized information. The risks posed in the IoT world are different to
those in the classic Internet world that runs on PCs. In IoT, devices may be very
limited in size, computational power and physical power supply, difﬁcult to access,
and exposed to harsh environments and unreliable networks. IoT offers great
opportunities for the manufacturing industry to utilize the power of communication
—this applies both for new as well as legacy equipment. However, even under the
extreme conditions some IoT devices have to operate, security of the data needs to
be guaranteed at all times to provide the highest quality of service. This article
describes various IoT threats. It also introduces an example of an IoT application in
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a real-world machine tool environment. A novel design—the IoT Unit—is pro-
posed that thrives to lower the barriers to a more secure, easy and efﬁcient appli-
cation of IoT for a prosperous Industry 4.0 world.
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